1. For a discussion concerning the definition of "pit bull dogs" see infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
2. See Hoffard, The Pit Bull Terrier: Should It Be Controlled by Law?, COMMUNITY ANIMAL CONTROL, Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 8 (anti-pit bull hysteria sweeping the country); Levoy, Born To Kill?, Cin. Enquirer Magazine, Jan.8.1984, at 4 (Cincinnati, Ohio pit bull dog controversy); Tietjen, Next Time It Could Be Your Breed, CANINE CHRON., Apr.14, 1984, at 6, 10 (Florida and Ohio legislation discussed).
3. Hoffard, supra note 2, at 9 (Minneapolis, Riverside, Cal., Hollywood, Fla., Cincinnati consider laws governing ownership of pit bull dogs). In at least six states - Alaska, California, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota and New Mexico - lawmakers have considered adopting policies that would control pit bull dogs. See N.Y. Times, June 18, 1984, at A12, col.1 (Anchorage, Ala. animal shelters stop offering pit bull dogs for adoption); U.P.I. Wire Service, May 17, 1984 (available Oct.1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Preston, Kan. enacted dog controls after pit bull dog owner convicted of involuntary manslaughter because of fatal attacks by his dogs); A.P. Wire Service, May 16, 1984 (available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Tijeras, N.M. banned ownership of pit bull dogs); Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 3, 1983, at C2 (new law required pit bull dogs be penned and muzzled); U.P.I. Wire Service, Sept. 14, 1983 (available Oct.1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Statute prohibiting running at large passed in Corales, N.M. following pit bull dog attack) U.P.I. Wire Service, Oct. 20, 1982 (available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (San Diego County passed new vicious dog laws after fatal mauling by pit bull dog); A.P. Wire Service, Jan. 16, 1980 (available Oct 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Hollywood, Fla. approved new pit bull dog ordinance).
4. See Fighting Dogs Attack Raises Alarm on Coast, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1982, at A1, col. 1 (pit bull dogs highly popular as pets because ownership gives people "macho" feeling). The role of pit bull dogs as a status symbol is shown in its extreme in discussions of dog fighting. See, e.g., Kroll, The Savage Pit, GEO, Nov. 1979, at 58.; Maher, The Tragedy of the American Pit Bull, COLUMBUS MONTHLY, Oct. 1983, at 153, 157 (hardened dog fighters regard pit bull as ego extension that may prove its loyalty and gameness by contining to fight when maimed or dying).
5. See, e.g., Boatfield, Clifford
& Rubright, The Confinement, Handling and Care of Fighting Dogs,
NEW METHODS, Mar. 1983 at 7, 9 (organized dog fighting spreading
rapidly in United States despite its illegality). Penalties for dog
fighting are often harsh: under California law, for example, a spectator
can be sentenced to one year in jail and an owner or trainer can be fined
$50,000. CAL. PENAL CODE Sub Section 597.5 (West 1983).
Federal statutes also make dog fighting criminal. See 7 U.S.C. Sub
Section 2156 (1982) (fines up to $5,000 and imprisonment of one year may
be imposed upon conviction
for sponsoring animal fight, buying, selling, delivering or transporting
animal used in fighting; or using postal system to promote animal fighting).
Enforcement of dog fighting laws, according to the chief investigator for
the Humane Society, is as difficult as cracking drug rings. "Both
the state and federal authorities simply have to get serious about this
problem. They think dog fights happen once in a while on a weekend,
in some far-off place. The truth of the matter is they're going
on every weekend all over the country." Kroll, supra note 4, at 76
(quoting Frantz Dantzler, chief investigator for Humane Society).
6. See HOLLYWOOD, FLA., CODE Sub Section 6-25 (1980). Section 6-25, requiring registration of pit bull dogs and proof of liability insurance, was declared unconstitutional, and thereby void, on November 9, 1982. See Holder v. City of Hollywood, No. 81-13968-CR, excerpt of proceedings at 8 (17th Cir. Broward Cty., Fla., Nov. 9, 1982) (available Nov. 18, 1982, city attorney's office).
7. HOLLYWOOD, FLA., CODE Sub Section 6-25 (1980).
8. A.P. Wire Service, May 16, 1984 (available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file).
9. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE Sub Section 701-25 (1983). This ordinance has been challenged in federal court on the grounds that it violates a dog owner's fourteenth and first amendment rights. See Lundy v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-84-1190 ( S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 22, 1984).
10. CINCINNATI MUN. CODE Sub Section 701-25 (1983).
12. id. Sub Section Sub Section 701-45, -99-B.
13. VILLAGE OF WALBRIDGE, OHIO, ORDINANCE 2-84 (Jan. 9, 1984).
14. See generally Jackson, Liability for Animals in Roman Law: An Historical Sketch, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122 (1978) (dog control laws date back to domestication). Regulation of dogs under Roman law, for example, may date back as far as the middle of the third century B.C.E. Id. at 129.
15. See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S.
228, 230 (1920); Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S.
698, 701 (1897); Thiele v. Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 447, 312P.2d 786, 789
(1957); Mayor of Hagerstown v. Witmer, 86 Md. 293, 300, 37 A. 965, 966
(1897); see also M. LORING, YOUR DOG AND THE LAW 3 (1983); 7 E. McQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Sub Section 24.284 (3d ed. 1981); Comment
, Nature of Property in Dogs, 4 IDAHO L. REV. 105 (1967). Property
rights in dog ownership were recognized as early as the Code of Hammurabi,
approximately
2100 B.C.E. See NEW DOG ENCYCLOPEDIA 21 (1970). Under English
common law, dogs were treated differently that other domestic animals because
they were viewed as creatures maintained for pleasure with no intrinsic
utility or food value. See Comment, supra, at 104. Because
dogs were not viewed as being as valuable as horses, cattle or sheep, an
owner's property interest in his dog was considered less than complete,
that is "qualified" or "imperfect." See Sentell v. New Orleans &
Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 700 (1897); Blair v. Forehand, 100
Mass. 136, 140 (1868).
16. See, e.g., Thiele v. Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 447, 312 P. 2d 786, 789 (1957) (modern trend to accord dogs full property status); Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 208, 290 P.2d 742, 743 (1955) (modern trend to regard dogs as tame domestic animals having value); Duff v. Louisville & N.R.R., 219 Ky. 238, 240, 292 S.W. 814, 815 (1927) (both statutes and judicial decisions recognize owners have full and complete property interest in dogs); Hodges v. Causey, 77 Miss. 353, 356, 26 So. 945, 946 (1900); Rose v. Salem, 77 or. 77, 82, 150 P. 276, 277 (1915); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 22-350 (West 1975); IND. CODE ANN. Sub Section 15-5-10-1 (Burns 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 79-1301 (1977); KY. REV. STAT. Sub Section 248.245 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 14:67.2 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, Sub Section 3404 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, Sub Section 196 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 77-1-1 (1978); VA. CODE Sub Section 29-213.95 (Supp. 1984); see also E. GREENE, THE LAW AND YOUR DOG 19, 27 (1969); M. LORING, supra note 15, at 2; cf. Comment, supra note 15, at 106 (state statutes must be consulted to determine dogs status as property).
17. See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S.
228, 231 (1920) (license fees); Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton
R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 701 (1897) (registration); Thiele v. Denver, 135 Colo.
442, 450, 312 P.2d 786, 791 (1957) (leash law); State v. Tull, 40 Del.
179, 189, 8 A.2d 17, 21 (1939) (collar and tags); Mayor of Hagerstown v.
Witmer, 86 Md. 293, 304, 37 A. 965, 967 (1897) (running at large); King
v. Arlington County, 195 Va. 1084, 1087, 81 S.E.2d 587, 589 (vicious dog
law)
(1954); Jenkins v. Waxahachie, 392 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965) (summary destruction).
18. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876). The states' police power is older than the Constitution. See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 131-32 (1837).
19. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (no one denies police power includes all matters affecting public health or public morals); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 138 (1837) police power includes duty of state to advance safety of its people and to provide for their general welfare); Bruck v. State, 228 Ind. 189, 198, 91 N.E.2d 349, 352 (1950) (police power involves promotion of order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society).
20. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537
(1934) (courts cannot override reasonable legislative policies to promote
public welfare); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911) (classifications under state's police power unconstitutional only
if without any reasonable basis and therefore purely arbitrary); Theile
v. Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 454, 312 P.2d 786, 793 (1957); see also 5 E.
McQUILLIN; supra note 15. Sub Section 19.05 (3d ed. 1980).
21. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
25 (1905) (police power regualtions must always yield to constitutional
rights); Waud v. Craword, 160 Iowa 432, 434, 141 N.W.1041 (1913) (police
power is very broad but not boundless); Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728,
737, 12 N.W.2d 387, 388 (1943) (reasonableness of police power exercise
subject to judicial review).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, Sub Section 1.
23. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416-417 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
24. For a discussion of the reasonableness standard see supra note 20.
25. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (police power regulation invalid only when there is no rational connection between regulation and promotion of safety); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (due process requires measure to address evil in rational way); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (laws with reasonable relation to proper legislative purpose, neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, satisfy due process requirements).
26. See generally NOWAK, supra note 23, at 555.
27. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
30. See generally NOWAK, supra note 23, at 586.
32. Id. ; see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (constitutional safeguards offended if classification rests wholly on grounds irrelevant to states objective); Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323 U.S. 32, 35 (1944) (legislative power to classify depends on rational basis); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56, 59 (1915) (classifications must be reasonable and related to objective of legislation). Extreme judicial deference generally is given to state legislation. However, if legislative classifications affect fundamental right or are based upon suspect categories, then the courts will apply intermediate or strict scrutiny. See generally NOWAK, supra note 23, at 591 (Supreme Court uses three different standards of review for equal protection questions.)
33. See generally NOWAK, supra note 23, at 588-90.
34. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 700 (1897).
40. See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 (1920); Thiele v. Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 449-50, 312 P.2d 786, 790-91 (1957); Walker v. Towle, 156 Ind. 639, 642, 59 N.E. 20, 22 (1901).
41. See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 (1920); Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 706 (1897); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 24-367 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 22-338 (West 1975); IND. CODE ANN. Sub Section 15-5-9-1 (Burns 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 19-2230 (1981); KY. REV. STAT. Sub Section 258.135 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, Sub Section 3451 (Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, Sub Section 191 (1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, Sub Section 137 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sub Section 955.01 (page Supp. 1983).
42. See, e.g., Thiele v Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 453, 312 P.2d 786, 792 (1957); Haller v. Sheridan, 27 Ind. 494, 495 (1867); Rose v. Salem, 77 Or. 77, 81, 150 P. 276, 277 (1915); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 24-370 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 22-364 (West 1975); FLA STAT. ANN. Sub Section 767.02 (West 1964); KY. REV. STAT. Sub Section 258.265 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, Sub Section 3455 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sub Section 715.23 (Page 1976).
43. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 24-378 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. Sub Section Sub Section 15-2.1-6-1 to - 13 (Burns 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 19-2230 (1981); KY. REV. STAT. Sub Section 258.015 (1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, Sub Section 145B (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1984).
44. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 24-367.01 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 22-342 (West 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sub Section 955.04 (Page Supp. 1983).
45. See, e.g., Town of Nutley v. Forney, 116 N.J. Super. 567, 579, 283 A.2d 142, 149 (1971) (ordinance requiring owner to remove dog excrement and dispose of it in sanitary manner valid police power exercise).
46. See, e.g., Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 702 (1897) (dogs hold their lives at will of legislature); Thiele v. Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 448, 312 p.2d 786, 789 (1957) (approving Sentell court rationale). But see Smith v. Costell, 77 Idaho 205, 208, 290 P.2d 742, 743 (1955) (dog not per se nuisance; statutes authorizing summary destruction of dogs running at large unconstitutional); Rose v. Salem, 77 Or. 77, 82, 150 P. 276, 277 (1915) (summary destruction even with notice to owner violates due process when statute declares dogs personal property). See generally Comment, supra note 15, at 114.
47. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Arcadia, 121 Cal. App. 660, 662-63, 9 P.2d 587, 588 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932); State v. Beckert, 137 N.J.L. 562, 564, 61 A.2d 213, 214 (1948); State v. Mueller, 220 Wis. 435, 433, 265 N.W. 103, 107 (1936). But see Smith v. Steineauf, 140 Kan. 407, 412, 36 P.2d 995, 998 (1934) (unreaasonable to restrict ownership without showing nuisance).
48. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE Sub Section 597.5 (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 53-247 (West 1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 828.122 (West Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sub Section 959.15 (Page Supp. 1983). Dog fighting is illegal in all states. See Kroll, supra note 4, at 76. There is a national trend to upgrade the crime of dog fighting to a felony. See U.P.I. Wire Service, June 20, 1984 (available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Missouri twenty-first state to make dog fighting felony).
49. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 22-333 (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, Sub Section 360 (Smith-Hurd 1975); IND. CODE ANN. Sub Section 15-5-9-14 (Burns 1983).
50. See, e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Sub
Section Sub Section 24-378, -521 (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE Sub Section
3342 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 22357 (West 1975);
FLA. STAT. ANN. Sub Section Sub Section 767.01, .04 (West 1964);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, Sub Section 366 (Smith-Hurd 1975); IND.
CODE ANN. Sub Section 15-5-12-1 (Burns 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
7, Sub Section 3651 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, Sub Section 155 (Michie/Law
Co-op. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sub Section 955.28 (Page 1968).
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS Sub Section 509
g (1938). At common law animal owner liability was predicated on the
classification of the animal: a possessor of a wild animal was strictly
liable for damages caused, while keepers of domestic animals, including
dogs, were not liable unless they had knowledge - scienter - of the animal's
viciousness. Id. Sub Section Sub Section 507, 509 f. Scienter related
to an animal owner's liability is an ancient legal principle stated in
the Bible. See 21 Exodus 28-31.
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. Sub Section 767.01 (West 1964) ("Owners of dogs shall be liable for any damage done by their dogs to sheep or other domestic animals or livestock, or to persons"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, Sub Section 366 (Smith-Hurd 1957) ("If a dog...without provocation, attacks or injures any person... the owner of such dog...is liable in damages."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sub Section 955.28 (Page 1976) ("The owner or keeper shall be liable for any damage caused by a dog unless the injured person was trespassing or was teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog on the owner's property."); see also Hallen, Liability of Dog Owners, 12 OHIO STATE L.J. (1951); Note, Dog Owner's Liability: Statutory Effects, 1960 DUKE L.J. 146; 10 U. CIN. L. REV. 115 (1936).
53. See HOLLYWOOD, FLA., CODE Sub Section 6-25 (1980).
54. See CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE Sub Section 701-25 (1983).
55. See HOLLYWOOD, FLA., CODE Sub Section Sub Section 6-26 (owner liability); 6-27 (vicious dog prohibited from running at large)(1980); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE Sub Section Sub Section 701-25 (a), (b) (restraint required) For a discussion of vicious dog laws see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
56. For a discussion of the requirements of the equal protection clause, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
57. For a discussion of the way the ordinances define pit bull dogs see supra notes 7, 10, 13 and accompanying text. The question of breed-specific ordinances was not before the United States Supreme Court in Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897), the seminal decision regarding dog control laws. In Sentell, the Court upheld a state and municipal decision regarding dog control laws. In Sentell, the Court upheld a state and municipal law that required dog owners to register their breeds. Id. at 706. The rationale of Sentell extends only to those ordinances that apply to all breeds, a limitation that has been unimportant until the new pit bull dog laws because canine control laws only aplied to all dogs. In dicta, the Court stated that it is "practically impossible by statute to distinguish between the different breeds, or between the valuable and the worthless." Id. at 701.
58. For a discussion of due process see supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
59. The city commissioners of Hollywood, Florida,
passed an ordinance aimed at controlling pit bull dogs after two serious
maulings, one involving an elderly woman, the other involving a child.
See Hoffard, supra note 2, at 9. The City Council of Cincinnati,
Ohio, amended its vicious dog laws specifically to include pit bull dogs
following a fatal attack on a child. See Levoy, supra note 2, at 5. Fatal
attacks on people by pit bull dogs have been reported across the county.
See A.P. Wire Service, Sept. 8, 1984, (available Oct. 1, 1984 on NEXIS,
Wire file) (Knoxville, Tenn. pit bull fatally attacked 23-month-old boy);
U.P.I. Wire Service, July 19, 1984 (available on Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS,
Wire file) (Preston, Kan., dog owner convicted of involuntary manslaughter
for death caused by his two pit bull dogs); U.P.I. Wire Service, Apr. 25,
1984
(available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Austin, Tex., 6-year
old killed by pit bull and St. Bernard);U.P.I. Wire Service, Oct. 20, 1983
(available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file)(Chicago, Ill. one-year-old
mauled to death by pit bull terrier); Cincinnati Post, Sept. 9, 1983, A1
(boy fatally mauled by pit bull dog); U.P.I. Wire Service, July 20, 1983,
(available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Athens, Ga. girl killed
by pit bull dog); U.P.I. Wire Service, July 8, 1983 (available Oct. 1,
1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Phoenix, Ariz. dogs, including two pit bull
dogs, attacked and killed Wire Service, June 9, 1983 (available Oct. 1,
1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (San Diego, Cal. pit bull dog owner sentenced
to five years probation and
ordered to pay damages to family of victim fatally mauled by his two
pit bull terriers); A.P. Wire Service, Aug. 26, 1981 (available Oct. 1,
1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) Brownsville, Tex. boy died from pit bull dog
bite); U.P.I. Wire Service, Feb. 19, 1981 (available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS,
Wire file) (Macon, Ga. owner charged with involuntary manslaughter of 11--year
old boy killed by two pit bull dogs); A.P. Wire Service, Sept. 25, 1979
(available Oct. 1, 1984, on NEXIS, Wire file) (Phoenix, Ariz. dogs, including
two pit bull dogs, attacked and killed child).
60. Pit bull dogs are known for their great strength
and for their willingness to fight to the death. Maher, supra note 4, at
157. The pit bull dog has distinctive physical characteristics.
It has extremely powerful jaws, an insensitivity to pain, and an
aggressiveness toward other dogs. Case, The Pit Bull Adoption Quandry,
COMMUNITY ANIMAL CONTROL, Mar.-Apr.
1984, at 11.
61. The pit bull dog is a crossbreed of a terrier,
known for its quickness and aggressiveness, and a bulldog. Mahler,
supra note 4, at 158. Commentators trace the breed's history to the
middle ages in England when bull baiting was a sport. A tethered
bull would be matched against a pack of dogs, usually bulldogs or mastiffs.
The dogs tried to bite the bull and drag
its nose to the ground; the bull defended itself by trying to gore
the dogs. When the English outlawed bull baiting in 1835, the pitting
of one dog against another became popular. Id.
62. Pickney & Kennedy, Traumatic Deaths from
Dog Attacks in the United States, 69 PEDIATRICS, Feb., 1982, at 193-94.
The report identified the following as responsible for human fatalities
during the study period from May, 1975 to April, 1980: German Shepard (16);
Husky (9); St. Bernard (8); Bull Terrier (6); Great Dane (6); Malamute
(5); Golden
Retriever (3); Boxer (2); Dachshund (2); Doberman Pinscher (2); Collie
(2); Rottweiler (1); Basenji (1); Chow-Chow (1); Labrador Retriever (1);
Yorkshire Terrier (1); mixed and unknown breeds (15). Id. at 194.
64. CINCINNATI HEALTH DEPARTMENT, 1983 STATISTICS ON DOG BITES INVESTIGATED BY THE DEPARTMENT (Jan.1 - Oct. 6, 1983) (unpublished data available from City of Cincinnati Health Department).
65. Id. Similar percentages were reported for Riverside, California where pit bulls accounted for less than 6% of the 667 reported bites. See Hoffard, supra note 2 at 8.
66. Hoffard, supra note 2, at 8. "The problem (with statistics) is that we don"t know the makeup of the dog population....We do know that the German Shepherd is by far the most popular breed. Its ranking on the most frequent attacking breeds may be proportionate to its population. Without accurate baseline data, meaningful analysis of a given breed's tendency to bite is impossible." Id. (quoting Riverside, Cal. Humane Society official).
67. The pit bull dog laws raise an additional
equal protection question when the ordinances define vicious dogs to include
all pit bull dogs. These ordinances appear to be overly inclusive
because, it may be argued, not all pit bull dogs are indeed vicious.
See Case, supra note 60, at 11, 28 (most pit bulls good with people); NEW
DOG ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
15, at 657 (Staffordshire Terriers affectionate, safe, docile).
This line of reasoning would be easily dismissed, however, by the general
rationale of the seminal canine control case, Sentell v. New Orleans &
Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897). In Sentell the court acknowledged
that canine control laws affect dogs that are "harmless" but stated that
the broad reach
of the law was necessary to accomplish protection of public safely.
Id. at 705. Thus, the argument that laws controlling pit bull dogs
are unfair in their affect upon harmless members of the breed would appear
to be easily refuted.
68. For a discussion of the difficulties in identifying a dog's breed see infra notes 70-74 and 83 and accompanying text.
69. For a discussion of the procedural due process requirement that the law provide notice to citizens and law enforcement officials see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
70. Registration is a process whereby the owner
of the dam registers the litter with the registry, prior to the time of
whelping. Both the stud and the brood bitch must be registered animals.
The registry establishes a chain of ancestry for one generation similar
to establishing a chain of title for real property. See E. GREENE,
supra note 16, at 46-53. Conformation standards exist for all registered
breeds. These standards are used by judges in the show ring.
However, experts on fighting dogs and observers hold that show standards
provide little assistance in identifying dogs involved in the current problem:
"[T]he conformation of the American Pit Bull Terrier differs greatly among
confiscated animals or in the photographs of underground" fighting
publications." Boatfield, Clifford & Rubright, supra note 5,
at 7. For a discussion of the difficulty in identifying pit bull
dogs see also Hoffard, supra note 2, at 10 (identification of pit bulls
complicated because they may not come from registered stock; even if registered,
dogs may not conform to standards of breed; many dogs are deliberately
cross-bred for various purposes).
71. Clifford, Observations on Fighting Dogs, 183 J. AM. VET. MED. A. 654 (1983). The American Kennel Club (AKC) is a nonprofit hundred-year-old organization comprised of more that three hundred member clubs. It is a cooperative association of dog clubs, each represented in AKC affairs by a delegate. Individual dog owners belong to the specialty club of their breed, or to the all-breed show-giving clubs. The specialty clubs are responsible for defining the standards of their breed. See NEW DOG ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 15, 353. The United Kennel Club (UKC), organized in 1898 as a private registry service, is the second oldest and second largest registry of pure-bred dogs in the United States. The American Pit Bull Terrier was the first breed registered by the UKC. The UKC registers 16 original breeds. See id. at 431.
72. Clifford, supra note 71, at 654.
74. It is estimated there is one dog for every
7.7 people in the United States. Interview with Harold Bates, Hamilton
County, Ohio, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, in Cincinnati,
Ohio (Sept. 24, 1984). Based on an estimated population of
226 million people, the total number of dogs in the United States therefore
is projected at 28,250,000. The american Kennel Club reports
it registered 1,850,248 dogs in 1983. Telephone interview with Ms.
A. Condon, American Kennel Club (Nov. 16, 1984). While the percentage
of registered dogs in the general population is unknown, the statistics
on registration and projections on the size of the canine population clearly
support the common-sense perception that the vast
majority of dogs are unregistered.
75. Holder v. City of Hollywood, 81-13968-CR, excerpt of proceedings, at 8 (17th Cir. Broward Cty., Fla., Nov. 9, 1982) (available Nov. 18, 1982, city attorney's office).
76. Id. According to the court, the ordinance failed to describe sufficiently what dogs should be registered. Id.
77. Id. at 5. The court questioned how an owner of a "Heinz variety 57" dog would know if they must go to city hall. Id.
82. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE Sub Section 701-25 (2) (c) (1983).
83. Letter from Gene P. King to Alden E. Stilson, Jr. (Apr. 20, 1984) (opinion of Ohio Veterinarian Medical Association regarding Cincinnati, Ohio legislation requiring veterinarian identification of dogs alleged to be of pit bull variety).
84. For a discussion of dog owner liability, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion of the increase in dog fighting and its role in the current pit bull dog problem, see supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
86. For a discussion of the constitutionality of canine control laws in general, see supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.